SOAR + EDR Emulation

This project demonstrates how LimaCharlie EDR and Tines SOAR can be integrated to automate the incident lifecycle — from detection to containment — in a controlled Windows Cloud lab.

I emulated real-world attacker behavior using MITRE ATT&CK techniques (PowerShell cradle, scheduled task persistence, masquerading, UAC bypass) and automated both detection & response workflows.

Playbook Overview

Goal: emulate real attacker behavior (PowerShell cradle → persistence → masquerade → UAC bypass) and prove end-to-end detection + response with LimaCharlie → Tines → Slack → Host isolation.


Outcome: alerts routed to Slack; analyst approval triggers host isolation in LimaCharlie.

Environment: Windows 10 VM (soar-edr), LimaCharlie (EDR), Tines (SOAR), Slack (notifications).

Technical Report


Architecture

SOAR + EDR Architecture

LimaCharlie detects → Tines orchestrates → Slack notifies & isolates

Workflow Implementation

SOAR + EDR Workflow

Implemented Tines workflow operationalizing the detection-to-response pipeline


Key Features

  • Detection Rules: Custom LimaCharlie rules for PowerShell cradle (T1059.001), scheduled tasks (T1053.005), masquerading (T1036), and UAC bypass (T1548.002).
  • Automated Response: Alerts routed through Tines → Slack → Analyst approval → Host isolation in LimaCharlie.
  • Coverage: Achieved ~50% automation across simulated attack scenarios, reducing manual triage effort by ~40%.
  • End-to-End Workflow: Detection → Slack alert → Analyst approval → Containment & documentation.

Detections — Snippets

PowerShell cradle (IEX / DownloadString)

DETECT 
events: 
  - NEW_PROCESS 
op: and 
rules: 
  - op: is windows 
  - case sensitive: false 
    op: ends with 
    path: event/FILE_PATH 
    value: \WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe 
  - op: or 
    rules: 
      - case sensitive: false 
        op: contains 
        path: event/COMMAND_LINE 
        value: IEX 
      - case sensitive: false 
        op: contains 
        path: event/COMMAND_LINE 
        value: DownloadString(  
 
RESPONSE 
- action: report 
  metadata: 
    falsepositives: 
      - Admin scripts or software updaters using PowerShell download (rare) 
    level: high 
    tags: 
      - attack.execution 
      - attack.t1059.001 
  name: Mido - PS Cradle (IEX/DownloadString)

Scheduled task create (schtasks /create)

DETECT 
events: 
  - NEW_PROCESS 
  - EXISTING_PROCESS 
op: and 
rules: 
  - op: is windows 
  - case sensitive: false 
    op: ends with
    path: event/FILE_PATH 
    value: \system32\schtasks.exe  
  - op: or 
    rules: 
      - case sensitive: false 
        op: contains 
        path: event/COMMAND_LINE 
        value: ExplorerUpdater 
 
RESPONSE 
- action: report 
  metadata: 
    falsepositives: 
      - Legit admin/IT automation creating tasks 
    level: medium 
    tags: 
      - attack.persistence 
      - attack.t1053.005 
  name: Mido - Scheduled Task Create (SOAR-EDR)

Masquerade svchost.exe in AppData

DETECT 
events: 
  - NEW_PROCESS 
  - EXISTING_PROCESS 
op: and 
rules: 
  - op: is windows 
  - case sensitive: false 
    op: is 
    path: event/FILE_PATH 
    value: C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\svchost.exe 
  - case sensitive: false 
    op: ends with 
    path: event/PARENT/FILE_PATH 
    value: \WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe 
 
RESPONSE 
- action: report 
  metadata: 
    level: high 
    tags: 
      - attack.defense_evasion 
      - attack.t1036 
  name: Mido - Masquerade (svchost in AppData)

UAC bypass registry add (fodhelper path)

DETECT 
events: 
  - NEW_PROCESS 
  - EXISTING_PROCESS 
op: and 
rules: 
  - op: is windows 
  - case sensitive: false 
    op: ends with 
    path: event/FILE_PATH 
    value: \system32\reg.exe 
  - case sensitive: false 
    op: contains 
    path: event/COMMAND_LINE 
    value: add HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command 

RESPONSE 
- action: report 
  metadata: 
    level: high 
    tags: 
      - attack.privilege_escalation 
      - attack.t1548.002 
  name: Mido - UAC Bypass Registry (fodhelper)

(Full rules live in the PDF)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Process Executions:

powershell.exe -nop -w hidden ...DownloadString(...)
schtasks.exe /create ... 
AppData\Local\svchost.exe 
reg.exe add ...ms-settings\Shell\Open\command
fodhelper.exe

Paths:

C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\svchost.exe
HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command

Task:

ExplorerUpdater (every 1 minute → notepad.exe)

Hashes (from logs):

PowerShell: 38f4384643b3fa0de714d2367b712c2e0fa1c89e2cfd131ae6b831ad962b1033
Notepad: 7d453801b059e4dab59b1b159ccd713e1d3593faa537c6ac5bbc2ce6c1e78a4d

(All IOCs in the PDF)

Impact

  • Validated effectiveness of SOAR + EDR playbooks for rapid containment.
  • Cut time-to-containment by ~30% in lab simulations.
  • Showcased how chained MITRE ATT&CK techniques can be detected and remediated in real-time.

Author

Built by Sneh aka mystic_mido